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* * * These large sections of the population [farmers] * * * were as
a matter of economic fact in a different relation to the community from
that occupied by industrial combinations. Farmers were widely scat-
tered and inured to habits of individualism; their economic fate was in
large measure dependent upon contingencies beyond their control.
* * * the threat [to the community] was of a different order from that
arising through combinations of industrialists and middlemen.14
An additional point raised by the defendant in the present case was that,
since agricultural combinations are exempted from the criminal statute
and not from the civil statute, the validity of the criminal statute is under-
mined and thus both statutes are invalidated. The court disposes of this
contention by saying that classifications that permit substantive differentia-
tions also permit differentiations of remedy. The Constitution contains no
doctrinaire requirement that acts and evils differing in degree though not in
kind must be subjected to identical remedial sanctions. S. M. M.
MANDAMUS - CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION - REFUSAL OF
LIQUOR LICENSE;--[Missouri].Petitioner applied to the director of liquor
licenses of Kansas City for a retail dealer's license. Pursuant to a city
ordinance, the application was referred to the board of police commissioners
and an investigation was ordered, the application to be returned to the
director with a report and recommendation. The report of the police com-
missioners recommended that no license be issued. Although not legally
bound to follow the recommendation of the police commissioners, the di-
rector refused to issue the license. Petitioner then procured an alternative
writ of mandamus commanding respondent to issue or show cause. The
trial resulted in a judgment which, in effect, made the writ permanent,
compelling the issuance of a license. From this judgment, respondent ap-
pealed. Held, that the director of liquor licenses, in the grant or refusal of
licenses, exercised a type of discretion that can not be controlled by man-
damus. Mangieracina v. Haney.1
It is a well-established rule that mandamus will issue to compel the
performance of a simple ministerial duty by a recalcitrant official. 2 When,
however, discretion is reposed in an official by law, and when the official has
properly exercised his judgment, the courts will refuse to issue mandamus
14. Id. at 145 (italics supplied). See Northern Wisconsin Co-op Tobacco
Pool v. Bekkedal (1924) 182 Wis. 571, 588, 197 N. W. 936, 943. See gen-
erally, Hanna, Cooperative Associations and the Public (1930) 29 Mich. L.
Rev. 148, 159, 163. See United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative (1939)
307 U. S. 533, for list of state cases approving special advantages given
agricultural cooperatives. See Note (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 347, 354, for state
statutes containing exemption similar to Texas act.
1. (Mo. App. 1940) 141 S. W. (2d) 89.
2. Dreyfus v. Lonergan (1898) 73 Mo. App. 336; State ex rel. Schade v.
Russell (1908) 131 Mo. App. 638, 110 S. W. 667; State ex rel. Journal
Printing Co. v. Dreyer (1914) 183 Mo. App. 463, 167 S. W. 1123; State
ex rel..Adamson v. Lafayette County Court (1867) 41 Mo. 545; State ex
rel. Metcalf v. Garesche (1877) 65 Mo. 480; State ex rel. North and South
Ry. v. Meier (1898) 143 Mo. 439, 45 S. W. 306; State ex rel. Dolman v.
Dickey (1920) 280 Mo. 536, 219 S. W. 363.
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to modify that judgment.3 To do so would be to substitute the discretion of
the court for that of the official to whom it was committed. 4 When there
has been a refusal to exercise discretion, a writ of mandamus is the proper
legal remedy to compel official action. 5 When discretion has been exercised
in an arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful manner, mandamus may be in-
voked to compel the exercise of discretion in a proper manner.6
In the instant case, the court quoted from other cases the following
interesting dictum: "It is only in cases where the facts essential to the
relator's rights are undisputed or have been confessed by the pleadings that
the discretion of the licensing authority may be controlled by mandamus.
' 7
At first blush this statement seems rather too broad, since it seems to per-
mit the courts to dictate the results of the exercise of discretion by a public
official, contrary to the conventional view.s Upon closer analysis of the
cases quoted, however, this statement can be harmonized with the conven-
tional view of mandamus on the ground that, when all facts essential to
relator's right are undisputed or stand confessed by the administrative
agency, the exercise of direct control by the court merely avoids circuity
3. State ex reL Gazzallo v. Hudson (1882) 13 Mo. App. 61; State ex rel.
Brown v. Stiff (1904) 104 Mo. App. 685, 78 S. W. 675; State ex rel. Heller
v. Thornhill (1913) 174 Mo. App. 469, 160 S. W. 558; State ex rel. Hen-
dricks v. Hopson (1914) 177 Mo. App. 12, 163 S. W. 279; State ex rel.
Hawkins v. Harris (Mo. App. 1922) 239 S. W. 564; State ex rel. Best v.
Jones (1900) 155 Mo. 570, 56 S. W. 307; State ex rel. Clark v. West (1917)
272 Mo. 304, 198 S. W. 1111.
4. State ex rel. Brown v. Stiff (1904) 104 Mo. App. 685, 78 S. W. 675;
State ex rel. Heller v. Thornhill (1913) 174 Mo. App. 469, 160 S. W. 558;
State ex rel. Hendricks v. Hopson (1914) 177 Mo. App. 12, 163 S. W. 279;
State ex rel. Best v. Jones (1900) 155 Mo. 570, 56 S. W. 307. See State
ex rel. Gehner v. Thompson (1927) 316 Mo. 1169, 293 S. W. 391.
5. State ex rel. Wear v. Francis (1888) 95 Mo. 44, 8 S. W. 1; State ex
rel. Hathaway v. State Board of Health (1891) 103 Mo. 22, 15 S. W. 322;
State ex rel. Best v. Jones (1900) 155 Mo. 570, 56 S. W. 307; State ex rel.
Gehrig v. Medly (Mo. App. 1930) 28 S. W. (2d) 1040, 1043: "'Where a
discretion is vested in a public officer, the courts will by mandamus compel
the officer to exercise that discretion, but will not direct how it shall be
exercised, or what conclusion or judgment shall be reached.' State ex rel.
Jones, 155 Mo. 570, 576, 56 S. W. 307, 309; State ex rel. v. Turnage, 217 Mo.
App. 278, 263 S. W. 497."
6. State ex rel. McCleary v. Adcock (1907) 206 Mo. 550, 105 S. W. 270;
State v. Bowman (Mo. App. 1927) 294 S. W. 107; See State ex rel. Shartel
v. Humphreys (1936) 338 Mo. 1091, 1098, 93 S. W. (2d) 924: "But such
discretion cannot be arbitrarily exercised, that is, exercised in bad faith,
capriciously, or by simple ipse dixit. When so exercised, it is regarded that
there was no discretion, recognized by law and in such case mandamus
will lie."
7. Mangiercina v. Haney (Mo. App. 1940) 141 S. W. (2d) 89. See: State
ex rel. Kelleher v. Board, St. Louis Public Schools (1896) 134 Mo. 296, 35
S. W. 617; State ex rel. Foerstel v. Higgins (1898) 76 Mo. App. 319.
8. State ex rel. Gazzallo v. Hudson (1882) 13 Mo. App. 61; State ex rel.
Foerstel v. Higgins (1898) 76 Mo. 319; State ex rel. Brown v. Stiff (1904)
104 Mo. App. 685, 78 S. W. 675; State ex rel. Heller v. Thornhill (1913)
174 Mo. App. 469, 160 S. W. 558; State ex rel. Dolman v. Dickey (1920)
280 Mo. 536, 219 S. W. 363; State ex rel. Gehner v. Thompson (1927) 316
Mo. 1169, 293 S. W. (2d) 391.
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of action. For example, in State ex rel. Journal Printing Co. v. Dreyer,9
involving the award of a public contract, the statute required that the
board award the contract to the lowest and best bidder. The facts were
undisputed that the relator submitted the lowest and best bid. The board,
in effect, thus admitted that had it exercised its discretion properly it could
have reached but one result. Therefore, instead of issuing mandamus to
compel proper exercise of discretion, the court issued mandamus to compel
the board to award the contract to relator. Again, in State ex rel. McCleary
v. Adcock,1o the statute set up certain requirements as a prerequisite to the
granting of a license. Since it was undisputed that the relator had ful-
filled the requirements, mandamus issued to compel the granting of the
license.
Paradoxically, the rule as to direct control by mandamus when all facts
essential to relator's right are admitted was first enunciated in a case
whose holding contravenes the orthodox application of mandamus. In that
case, State ex rel. Kelleher v. Board, St. Louis Public Schools,11 the statute
provided for the appointment by a school board of judges and clerks for its
elections. No requirements were set out as to the political affiliations of
the appointees, but, because of the danger of a "gross fraud" on the public,
mandamus issued to compel the selection of an equal number of Republicans
and Democrats. The board's discretion, exercised properly under the terms
of the statute, was directly controlled by the court.
The rule, then, seems to be that mandamus will issue (1) to compel
performance of a ministerial duty; 12 (2) to compel exercise of discretion
when there has been a refusal to take action;13 (3) to compel the exercise
of discretion in a proper manner when its exercise has been arbitrary,
capricious, or unlawful;1 4 and (4) to compel a particular result when the
authority in whom discretion is vested admits in effect that, in the proper
exercise of its discretion, there can be but one result.15 Since the instant
case falls into none of these categories, mandamus was properly denied.
N. B. K.
TORTS-RIGHT OF PRIVACY-LIABILITY FOR VIOLATING RETIREDIENT OF
PuLic FiGURE-[Federal] .- Plaintiff was a former child prodigy who had
drawn wide publicity when at the age of eleven he lectured to mathema-
ticians on the fourth dimension and when at the age of sixteen he was
graduated from Harvard. Some thirty years later he was living as un-
obtrusively as possible, working at a petty office job, and rooming in a
boarding house in Boston. Defendant, publisher of The New Yorker maga-
9. (1914) 183 Mo. App. 463, 481, 167 S. W. 1123, 1127.
10. (1907) 206 Mo. 550, 105 S. W. 270.
11. (1896) 134 Mo. 296, 35 S. W. 617.
12. See cases cited supra note 2.
13. See cases cited supra note 5.
14. See cases cited supra note 6.
15. State ex rel. Journal Printing Co. v. Dreyer (1914) 183 Mo. App.
463, 481, 167 S. W. 1123, 1127; State ex rel. McCleary v. Adcock (1907)
206 Mo. 550, 105 S. W. 270.
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